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The Coastal-Inland Income Gap in China during the 1990s:  
The Role of Geography and Policy 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the enlarging coastal-inland income gap in China during the 
1990s, using GMM estimation of a Solow growth model. Disaggregating capital 
investment by source: public, foreign and private: helps to disentangle the effect of 
policy from those of geography. The impact of public investment on growth is 
insignificant in our panel data for 29 provinces; that of foreign investment is 
significant; private investment is most influential. We also use the distance by 
railway of each province’s capital city to its nearest port city as a proxy for 
transportation costs, and find significant differences across regions. Distance has 
negative effects on economic development but its marginal impact effects become 
less as distance increases. The coastal-inland gap will grow in the foreseeable future, 
if inland areas are not able to benefit from an increase in private investment and 
infrastructure improvements (to reduce transport costs). 
Key words: China, Growth, Geography, Coast, Inland, Inequality and Policy. 
JEL classifications: O11, O15, O18, O20, O47, O53, P21, R11 and R12 
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I. Introduction 
China receives attentions from the world for obvious reasons. It is a transitional 
economy, turning from plan to market system; it is a country with the largest population 
and the third largest area in the world. The 9.6 million kilometer-squared land is 
divided into 31 administrative regions at provincial level, which are comprised of 5 
autonomous regions, 4 metropolitan cities and 22 provinces. However, the regions are 
very different from each other in terms of geographical locations, natural conditions, 
cultural features and educational levels, among others. Therefore, the heterogeneity in 
the regional development process during the reform period attracts the attention of 
economists in many aspects. In this paper, regional inequality between coastal and 
inland areas in economic growth is our subject. 
After the inception of economic reform, both coastal and inland areas in China 
developed very rapidly. However, the most distinguishable feature of regional 
development in China is the increasing gap between coastal and inland areas in terms of 
economic performance. Many facts show that a typical inland area lags far behind as a 
typical coastal area gets  more and more prosperous. Is this due to the geographical 
location difference?  
The relationship between geographical location and economic development has been 
investigated by many researchers. Typically, controlling for economic policies and 
institutions, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998) study the possible channels through 
which geographical effects can influence economic growth and policy choices. Their 
finding shows that geography has large influence on economic development via 
channels such as transportation costs, agricultural productivity, and natural resource  
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endowments among others. Geography itself is a factor in the choice of economic 
policy. On the other hand, Krugman (1998) employs the tension between ‘centripetal’ 
and ‘centrifugal’ forces acting on economic activity to study this problem. He 
concluded that different responses to these forces could make relatively similar 
locations end up with quite different market powers. The above two approaches are 
compared by  Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998), in which they conclude that 
Krugman’s model shows “how increasing returns to scale, agglomeration economies, 
transportation costs and product differentiation can lead to a highly differentiated 
spatial organization of economic activity, even when the underlying physical geography 
is undifferentiated.” In particular, the role of ‘self-enforcing’ in spatial patterns is 
emphasized in his model. However, the starting point in the model of Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger is that, “the physical geography is in fact highly differentiated”, which has 
the advantage of matching well for the case of coast-inland studies. 
The problem of the enlarging income gap between coastal and inland areas in China 
has been studied extensively; our summary is not exhaustive. Jian, Sachs and Warner 
(1996) attribute the convergence phenomenon during 1980s to the catching up of the 
initially poorer southern coastal provinces to the initially richer northern coastal 
provinces. Kanbur and Zhang (1999) compare the urban-rural and the coastal-inland 
income gap in China during the 1980s and 1990s. They draw the conclusion that the 
former has not changed much over time, while the latter has increased several fold and 
thus becomes the dominant source of income inequality in China after 1990. Fleisher 
and Chen (1997) consider that the lower factor productivity of inland areas compared 
with coastal areas contributes to the persistent income gap between them, while  
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investment in higher education and the concentration of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
helps to explain the productivity gap. In another paper, using provincial data for China 
from 1978 to 1993, Chen and  Fleisher (1996) conclude that the income gap between 
coastal and inland areas is likely to increase in the near future and to focus solely on 
investment by rural collectives is insufficient to narrow the gap. In Demurger (2001), it 
is found that geographical locations and infrastructure endowment account significantly 
for the observed differences in growth performance across China’s provinces. Wang and 
Hu (1999) argue that preferential policies generate higher growth for coastal provinces; 
at the same time, they also admit that their policy variable does not distinguish 
geographical locations, which may produce erroneous results. More recently, to explain 
the causes of the coastal and inland income gap, Demurger et al (2001) employ a model 
that disentangles policy factors and geographical factors in coastal areas’ economic 
growth and a set of preferential policy indices has been used to capture policy effects 
on growth. Their conclusion, opposite to the argument by Wang and Hu (1999), is that 
the absence of favored polices in the coastal areas would not affect the economic 
growth rates of both the coastal and inland areas. 
It is noted that both of the last two papers consider policy effects, yet different 
methods are employed for the analysis and different results have been obtained. In fact, 
the advantages of coastal areas relative to inland areas in China arise not only from 
their easier access to and cheaper transportation costs when accessing both international 
and domestic markets, but also from more favored conditions granted by “open door” 
policies. This suggests that policy should play an important role in the economic 
development process. Therefore, in this paper, apart from geographical factors, the  
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policy factor is also taken into consideration, and we attempt to disentangle the 
influences of these two factors. In particular, the policy influence has been picked up by 
geographical distribution of capital investment in different ownership structures; while 
the geographical influence has been picked up by railway distance from each province’s 
capital city to its nearest port city. These two methods are explained in detail as follows. 
Firstly, it has been shown in Wang (2003) that capital investment has a positive and 
significant effect on regional economic growth. Thus, the more investment in physical 
capital a region receives, the higher economic growth rate it will achieve. However, the 
different performance of different ownership structures might not be captured by this 
aggregated capital investment, which is represented by total investment in fixed assets. 
Therefore, in order to capture the different effects exhibited by different ownerships on 
economic growth, we disaggregate capital investment in accordance with its ownership 
structure. The decomposition relaxes the underlying assumption that different ownership 
structures of capital investment affect economic growth to the same degree. Thus we will 
investigate the different impacts of the components of capital investment, on regional 
economic growth; foreign, domestic private and public investments are the components 
we consider. Furthermore, the geographical distribution of disaggregated capital 
investments has been affected by government policies to a large extent. In particular, the 
open door policy has granted coastal areas more favored conditions than inland provinces 
to attract foreign investment; this has led to the concentration of foreign investment in the 
coastal areas. On the other hand, public investment has been decided and allocated by 
both the central and local governments, therefore it is more evenly distributed between  
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the coastal and inland areas. Thus, distinguishing public investment from other 
investment removes some of the overlap between policy and geographical effects.  
Secondly, railway is the major transportation means within China. We assume 
transportation costs for a province can be proxied by the distance (by railway) between 
the provincial capital and its nearest port city. Such a distance can be used to model part 
of the cost of investment goods.  
Therefore the objectives of this paper are to investigate the persistence and widening 
of the gap between coastal and inland areas by disentangling policy effects from 
geographical factors, which are captured by capital investment distribution and railway 
distance, respectively. In particular, we hope to uncover their roles in shaping the 
patterns of the coastal-inland gap in the 1990s. The structure of this paper is as follows. 
First, the coastal-inland gap in the 1990s is described in section-II. Secondly, the 
geographical distribution of disaggregated capital investments is illustrated in section-
III, to give a better understanding of the different performances by different capital 
investment across regions. Thirdly, in section-IV, we introduce our model and present 
an empirical analysis of disaggregated capital investments by taking account of 
geographical factors. The results show that differences in ownership exhibit different 
influences on economic growth, while distance displays negative effects on economic 
growth, but at a decreasing rate as distance increases. The roles of public, foreign and 
domestic private investment will be discussed in detail in this section. And finally, the 
conclusion is given in section-V. 
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II. The Coastal-Inland Income Gap during the 1990s 
There are 12 regions along the East Coast of China, including three metropolitan 
cities: Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin; and nine provinces: Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. Among the other 19, 
inland, regions, 9 are located in the middle part of China, which covers Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; while the 
other 10 regions belong to the western part; these are Chongqing (the fourth 
metropolitan city), Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang and Tibet. As in Wang (2003), it is noted that Tibet is excluded from our 
analysis for lack of data; while Chongqing is included in Sichuan Province, since its 
identity has been changed from an ordinary city to a metropolitan city only after 1997. 
In sum, we are going to deal with 29 regions, for which 12 belong to the coastal areas 
and 17 belong to the inland areas; the latter comprises 9 from the middle and 8 from the 
western part.  
The coast-inland income gap today may be divided into two components: the initial 
income gap and the growth rates of different areas. Therefore, to show the initial 
income gap, the per capita real GDP of each region in 1991 is depicted in figure 1 by 
the regional geographical location. Obvious regional disparities can then be observed 
from the figure as per capita GDP level decreases from east coast to west inland. On the 
other hand, when looking at the growth rates, which are calculated as the averages of 
the differences in (natural) logarithm of per capita GDP between the initial and final 
years, figure 2 shows that most provinces in coastal areas grow faster than provinces in 
inland areas. For example, three coastal provinces: Fujian, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, whose  
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per capita GDP grows at 14.44%, 13.64% and 13.28% per year respectively, exhibit the 
fastest growth rates in the 1990s. All eight western provinces grow at the slowest rate. 
The only inland province that grows as quickly as the top five fastest areas in China is 
Anhui province, which is located in the middle part of China. It is also noted that 
Liaoning province displays the slowest growth rate within coastal areas. As the 
northeast industrial center and the base for state owned enterprises (SOEs), such a 
disappointing performance indicates the plight of SOEs, and this will be further 
explained below. These two figures well exhibit the coast-inland income gap in the 
1990s. In summary, coastal regions grow at faster rates, which further enlarge the 
coastal-inland income gap when combined with higher initial income levels. 
[Figure 1 and 2 here] 
Furthermore, the above regional inequality can be examined more accurately b y 
employing the concept of sigma convergence. Jian  et al (1996) apply this concept to 
investigate the tendency towards convergence among China’s provinces from 1952-1993. 
Their results show that evidence for sigma convergence is weak during the period 1952-
1965 and strong between 1978-1990, while strong evidence of sigma divergence can be 
seen during both 1965-1977 and 1990-1993. The divergence from 1990-1993, as they 
claimed, is entirely caused by the enlarged variance between coastal and inland areas, not 
within each area. Therefore, they concluded that regions within coastal areas display 
sigma convergence, while the coastal-inland gap keeps increasing. Following this 
method, sigma convergence is also analyzed in this paper by using regional data in China 
from 1993-1999, which is illustrated in  figure 3. The standard deviations of regional 
logarithm of per capita real GDP from 1993-1999 within coastal areas, inland areas,  
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between coastal and inland and the aggregated areas are represented by  sigma-coast, 
sigma-inland,  sigma-between and sigma-aggregated, respectively. They are related as 
follows. The total sum of squared deviations (of log per capita GDP) can be 
decomposed into the sum of squares within areas (coastal and inland) plus the sum of 
squares between areas. Each sum of squares (coastal, inland, between) yields standard 
deviation. Firstly, figure 3 shows that there is no strong evidence of sigma convergence 
within either coastal or inland areas, and the flatness of both lines indicates catching-up 
within neither. Secondly, it can be observed that the largest component of  sigma-
aggregated is sigma-coast, while all three sigmas have a similar slight upward trend 
from 1995 onwards.  
A variance decomposition table for this figure is displayed in table 1, which provides 
the exact values for the four curves.  
[Figure 3 and table 1 here] 
In general, a conclusion can be drawn from the above observations: the enlarged gap 
between coastal and inland areas leads to the aggregated divergence during the 1990s. At 
the same time, no sigma convergence within coastal or inland areas is to be observed. 
 
III. Geographical Distribution of Disaggregated Capital Investments 
The issue of ownership indeed attracts special attention in the literature addressing 
economic growth in China.  Berthelemy and Demurger (2000)  regard the transfer of 
foreign technology as the key factor determining economic growth. Yet they also suggest 
that economic growth might simultaneously influence the inflows of foreign capital. 
Chen, Chang and Zhang (1995) find that FDI, lagged one year, has a positive effect on  
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economic growth.  Dees (1998) supports the view that FDI affects China's economic 
growth through the diffusion of ideas; while Wei (1996) concludes that FDI has a weak 
positive effect on economic growth. On the other hand, in a project supported by the 
Asian Development Bank, Mao and Zhang (2001) look into the relationship between the 
employment share of private enterprises and per capita GDP using 30 regions’ data in 
1999 for China. They conclude that private sector development is very much associated 
with regional income level and promotes regional economic growth. The latter 
conclusion has also been drawn by both Chen and Feng (2000) and Qian, Weingast and 
Cao (1997). However, it is pointed out that public investment has not been efficiently 
allocated or allocated to produce at a profitable scale, by some researchers such as Chen 
and Feng (2000); they find the presence of SOEs reduces the regional growth rate. 
The decomposition of capital investment is shown in table 2. Total investment in fixed 
assets is disaggregated into public, foreign and domestic private investment. Public 
investment includes investments in fixed assets by SOEs and Collective-Owned 
Enterprises (COEs). Foreign investment refers to investments in fixed assets by Foreign-
Owned Enterprises (FOEs) and Overseas Chinese-Funded Enterprises (OCEs). Domestic 
private investment refers to all private investments without foreign ownership.  
[Table 2 here] 
When examining the distribution of disaggregated capital investments in China, it has 
been pointed out that the most  noticeable feature is the concentration of foreign 
investment in coastal areas: thus OECD (2000), “From 1983 to 1998, FDI in the eastern 
region took up 87.8 percent while the central region attracted 8.9 percent and the western 
region recorded only 3.3 percent.” However, the distribution  of public and domestic  
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private investment is not given explicitly. In order to investigate this problem, table 3 lists 
simple averages of the ratios of the capital investment in fixed assets to GDP across the 
1990s, for coastal and inland areas. From this  table, firstly we see that all kinds of 
investments have higher ratios in coastal areas except investment made by SOEs. In fact, 
the exception can be ascribed to a political reason: SOEs are allocated by the central and 
local governments. Before economic reform, inland areas were more favored for the 
establishment of SOEs since they are further away from the outside world, thus reducing 
the risks induced by any possible conflicts between China and other countries. However, 
locating SOEs in inland areas turned out to be a disadvantage when trying to attract 
private investments (both foreign and domestic) after China adopted the open door 
policy. There is such a slow development of private investment in the inland areas that 
public investment, especially investment from SOEs, continues to be the major 
contributor of capital investment.  
[Table 3 here] 
Secondly, besides influencing SOEs’ investment distribution patterns, government 
policy has also affected the foreign investment distribution pattern to a large extent. As 
shown in table 3, coastal areas receive relative to GDP almost 4 times the foreign 
investment that inland areas receive. The argument that the open door policy plays an 
important role in determining the geographical distribution of foreign investment is based 
on official statements with respect to the open door policy and the economic reform 
process: there was almost no foreign capital investment in China before economic 
reform. During the economic reform period, the establishment of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), economic and technology development zones (ETDZs) and the Pudong  
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New Development Area has boosted foreign capital investment inflows. All the areas that 
benefit greatly by the open door policy are located along the coast. For example, two 
coastal cities, Guangzhou and Shanghai, take the lead in both economic development and 
attracting foreign investments. The reasons that they are favored by foreign investors are 
not only their easier access to the international market, but also their leading roles in 
China’s open door process to the outside world. Their easier access to the international 
market is because both of them are major port cities and have close relationships with 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Further their leading roles are clear from the fact that 
Guangdong Province has three out of four SEZs while Shanghai has the biggest open area 
in China – Pudong. Hence the high share in foreign investment of these two regions may 
be attributed to their favored conditions granted by the open door policy.  
On the other hand, compared with the concentration of foreign investment in coastal 
areas, SOEs’ investment and domestic private investment distribute rather evenly at 
national level. This different geographical distribution pattern should be attributed to the 
less favored policy that inland regions receive. In general, coastal areas receive a 
considerably higher share of capital investment than inland areas, which would account 
for higher economic growth. 
From the above analysis, we may conclude that policy is a determining factor for the 
distribution patterns of disaggregated capital investments. In particular, egalitarian policy 
shaped the distribution pattern of public investment before the economic reform. The 
open door policy leads to the highly concentrated distribution of foreign investment after 
the reform. Thus it is appropriate to use the geographical distribution of the disaggregated 
capital investments as a proxy for policy influence.   
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IV. Empirical Modeling and Application  
To trace factors leading to the enlarging coast-inland income gap, first we consider the 
sources leading to the regional economic growth patterns. Since coastal and inland areas 
receive a different distribution of capital investment in different ownership, the 
disaggregation allows us to investigate the different roles displayed by the various 
ownership structures in shaping income inequality. Moreover, the geographical 
distribution of capital investment is very much influenced by policies. Thus, the different 
geographical distribution of ownership is capable of capturing different policies that 
government applies to different regions.  
On the other hand, we use distance by railway, from each province’s capital city to its 
nearest port city, as a measure for regional geographical location; more specifically, to 
see whether this region is far from coastline or not. From a table of the railway distances 
between major Chinese cities, four coastal cities have been picked out as the major port 
cities – Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Haikou, for the analysis. The first three are the 
large port cities with great freight handling capabilities; there selection is straightforward. 
The fourth one – Haikou is chosen as it is the capital city of an island province – Hainan. 
Since Hainan has no railway connections with other parts of China, Haikou is in fact the 
only choice as the port city for the international trade of Hainan province, especially 
when railway distance is chosen as the major transportation means. The further away a 
province is located from these port cities, the higher transportation costs will be, and thus 
the harder it will be for such a province to gain foreign investment.   
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This paper resorts to the Solow growth model to study the influences of policy factors 
and geographical factors on regional economic growth patterns. First we look at the 
Solow growth model based on a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
? ? ? ?
1 ) ( t t t t L A K Y     1 0 ? ? ?                         (1) 
where Yt is the output level, Kt is the capital stock, Lt stands for labor, and At represents 
the technological development level.  Lt and  At are assumed to grow at rates n and g 
respectively. As derived in Wang (2003); but omitting time effects, the dynamic model of 
the level of per capita GDP is: 
it it it t i i it s p L Y L Y ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ln ln ) / ln( ) / ln( 2 1 1 , 0               (2) 
Suppose s is the share of savings to GDP and p stands for population growth rate, we 
also assume that investment in each region consists of a fixed part of investment due to 
fixed costs and an additional part of investment due to transportation costs, then distance 
plays its role through the influence on transportation costs in our model: 
DC FC t sY t I ? ? ? ) ( ) (                                         (3) 
in which FC stands for the fixed costs and DC stands for the transportation costs. 
From the above equation, we can derive 
2 1 s s
Y
DC
Y
FC
Y
DC FC
s ? ? ? ?
?
? .                            (4) 
Thus taking logs of the above gives 
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1 2 1 ) (
2
1
) ( ln ) 1 ln( ln )] 1 ( ln[ ) ln( ln
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s s s s ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
for all  1
1
2 ?
s
s
.                                                                                                  (5)  
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It is reasonable to suppose  1 1 2 ? s s  considering that the transportation costs normally 
will not surpass the fixed costs for a specific investment project. Now substituting the 
investment equation (5) into equation (2) gives 
it t i it t i i it s
s
s
s
s p L Y L Y ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ] ) (
2
1
[ln ln ) / ln( ) / ln(
2
1
2
1
2
, 1 2 1 1 , 0    (6) 
In the above model,  ? i  represent the unobserved regional characteristics such as 
cultural features, economic development levels, et al; Y/L stands for per capita real GDP 
at 1991’s prices. The data used are from the Chinese Statistics Yearbooks from 1994 to 
2000. Per capita real GDP is used to measure regional income. GDP indices are used to 
deflate GDP in current price to 1991 constant prices. Total investment in fixed assets is 
the proxy for capital investment. Its ratio to GDP, represented by 1 s , is further 
disaggregated by its ownership structure.  1 2 s s , which is the ratio of transportation costs 
to fixed costs, is proxied by the railway distance from each region’s capital city to its 
nearest port city. This railway distance variable is measured in 1000 km. For example, 
Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang Autonomous region that has the longest distance 
from its nearest port city, is measured to be 3.911 (?1000 km) roughly. On the other 
hand, it is noted that the distance of all the four port cities on their own are specified as 
0.001 (?1000 km), since being a port city does not mean zero transportation cost, though 
this cost might be rather less.  
Our time dummy is set to be 1 if years are between 1994 and 1996 and 0 otherwise, 
that is 
1 0 ? ?  if years? [1994, 1996] &  0 0 ? ? otherwise                     (7)  
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Allowing for one-year lag, our data starts from 1994. We choose 1996 as the transition 
year as the Asian Financial Crisis happened in 1997, which had affected the inflow of 
foreign investment into China significantly. As demonstrated in figure 4, both the FDI to 
GDP ratio and the foreign investment to GDP ratio decrease faster after 1997, while only 
the domestic private investment ratio shows an upward trend and increases even faster 
afterwards. Based on these facts, those changes are then captured by modifying our 
regression equation (6) to be 
it it r r it f f
it sc sc it t i i it
s
s
s
s
sr sf
ssc p L Y L Y
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
2
1
2
4
1
2
3 0
*
2 2 0
*
2 2
0
*
2 2 1 1 , 0
) (
2
1
ln ) ( ln ) (
ln ) ( ln ) / ln( ) / ln(
         (8) 
[Figure 4 here] 
GMM estimation has been carried out using  PcGive 10. This estimator follows 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which was then modified by Windmeijer (2000) to correct the 
standard errors generated by the two-step GMM estimator. Lags of more than two years 
of the dependent variable are employed to construct the GMM IV matrix, and the 
analysis uses both the first-difference transformed data set and the levels data. We 
assume that the error terms are serially un-correlated. The empirical analysis results are 
given in table 4, together with the test results. Before starting to interpret the analysis 
results, we first check the validity of our assumptions using the test results. The Sargan 
and AR (1) and (2) tests are all based on two-step GMM estimation results. Firstly, the 
Sargan test shows that we cannot reject our hypothesis that the instrumental variable 
matrix is valid. Secondly, from the AR test, apparently AR (1) has negative and 
significant results while AR (2) has insignificant results. The idea of AR tests is that, if 
error term is not serially correlated, the differenced error term will be first order  
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negatively correlated and second order serially un-correlated. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the hypothesis of serial un-correlation in the error term cannot be rejected.  
[Table 4 here] 
Now we start to interpret the empirical analysis results. As in table 4, both one-step 
and two-step GMM estimation results are listed, though two-step results are normally 
regarded as more efficient than one-step. Firstly we look at the convergence speed. The 
convergence speed calculated from the two-step GMM estimation results is about 15.6% 
annually, which indicates that those regions need 4.44 years to halve the deviation from 
their own balanced growth paths. Population growth displays negative effects on 
economic growth. 
The second point, which is also the most important part to be interpreted in table 4, is 
the role of different ownership structures on economic growth. From the elasticities of 
ratios of disaggregated capital investment/GDP to per capita GDP, the results clearly 
suggest that the components of disaggregated capital investments exhibit quantitatively 
different influences on the national economy. In particular, domestic private  investment 
has the highest elasticity in the estimation, which is 3.3 + 3.2 = 6.5% with time dummy 
and 3.3% without, both significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, public investment 
proves to be insignificant, with and without time dummy. Thus during the whole data 
period, domestic private investment has a positive influence on economic growth, while 
public investment shows an insignificant effect. Further, the estimated elasticity of 
foreign investment changes from insignificance with time dummy to  2.8% without. 
Therefore, foreign investment has a similar positive effect throughout data period.   
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Thirdly, we start to analyse the influence of transportation costs on economic growth. 
The results from table 4 show that distance (Distance) has a negative  sign, while the 
squared distance (Sq distance) has a positive sign. If we write the distance components 
in equation (8) as
2
4 3 2
1
d d ? ? ? , there is a minimum at a positive value: 
4
3
?
?
? d                                                                      (9) 
as  0 3 ? ?  and   0
2
1
4 ? ? ?                                                                            
Applying equation (9) to the two-step estimation results in table 4, which gives that 
0.1315 3 ? ? ?  and  4 2 1 ? ?  = 0.0304, both significant at 1% level, the minimum can then 
be found at a distance of 2.16 (?1000 km) to the nearest port city.  
To calculate the 95% asymptotic confidence interval, the delta method is used, to 
produce (1.87, 2.45). According to this distance, from our data set, it can be seen that 
there are four regions located on the right hand side of the minimum point, which are 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Xinjiang; while all the others are located on its left hand 
side. Indeed, only one region, Xinjiang, lies to the right of the confidence interval. In 
figure 5, the relationship between the distance and the economic development level is 
illustrated. The model predicts,  ceteribus paribus, a reduction of growth as  distance 
increases, with a diminishing marginal effect, until the minimum is reached. The data 
exhibit growth reducing with distance, except for Xinjiang. However, the distance effect 
is limited. 
[Figure 5 here] 
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VI. Conclusion 
This paper examines the role of disaggregated capital investments and the function of 
geography in regional economic growth. When coastal-inland inequality becomes the 
major source of income inequality in China, the geographical factors are found to be 
important in influencing the regional economic growth patterns. To single out the role 
played by geography in determining economic growth, a coastal dummy has been 
employed by a number of economists. However, we would argue that this dummy is not 
able fully to represent the influence of geography on economic growth, and it is also 
correlated with other regional effects, such as policy influences.  
To separate policy factors and geographical factors influencing regional economic 
growth, two terms are employed in this paper; the geographical distribution of 
disaggregated capital investments and railway distances.  
Being influenced by the policies, different distribution patterns of the public, foreign 
and domestic private investments are observed in different regions of China. Since all the 
SEZs and ETDZs are located in the coastal areas, there is no doubt that they are more 
favored than inland areas by foreign investors, and this leads to the concentration of 
foreign investment in these areas. At the same time, public investment is more evenly 
distributed geographically due to the strict government control of the SOEs; this reflects  
the political consideration that inland areas are far from the coast and thus away from any 
possible conflict.   
On the other hand, the economic reform process in China is also accompanied by the 
rapid development of the domestic private sector. While the influence of public 
investment on the economic growth is becoming less and less, as is implied by our non- 
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significant estimation results, the influence of the domestic private sector grows rapidly 
during the 1990s, which is also clearly shown from the positive estimated elasticity of the 
ratio of the domestic private investment/GDP to per capita income.  
Geographical factors have been taken into consideration by  introducing the 
transportation costs, which are proxied by the railway distance from the capital city of 
each region to its nearest port city. Since longer distances lead to higher transportation 
costs and thence more obstacles to investors, it is reasonable to assume that regions 
located further from coast tend to have lower GDP per capita when other conditions 
remain the same, and this matches fairly well with the fact that a typical inland area is 
growing less rapidly than a typical coastal area. Therefore, distance plays a negative role 
in economic growth. However, such a negative effect would increase more slowly as 
distance increases. The most distant region, Xinjiang, appears to be an outlier, but rail 
may not be so dominant a means of transport in this case. 
  The analysis of this paper identifies two major reasons for inland areas to lag far 
behind coastal areas in terms of economic development: (a) lack of foreign and domestic 
private investments, (b) their greater distance from the coast. Therefore, to attract more 
private investment, and to provide a better transport infrastructure, may be the means for 
the inland areas to develop faster and reduce the coast-inland income gap.  
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Table 1. Variance decomposition for figure 3 
 
Year  ?-Coast  ?-Inland  ?-Between  ?-Aggregate 
1993  0.444  0.229  0.351  0.486 
1994  0.439  0.231  0.373  0.500 
1995  0.424  0.235  0.380  0.501 
1996  0.431  0.237  0.379  0.504 
1997  0.438  0.243  0.384  0.511 
1998  0.442  0.245  0.391  0.518 
1999  0.448  0.245  0.399  0.527 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Ratios of disaggregated capital investments to GDP 
 
s : ratio of capital investment to total GDP. 
Lnssc = ln((total investment in fixed 
assets by SOEs + COEs)  /  total GDP) 
(Log) Ratio of Public investment to 
GDP  
lnsf = ln((total investment in fixed 
assets by FOEs + OCEs)  / total GDP) 
(Log) Ratio of Foreign investment to 
GDP  
lnsr = ln(The rest of total investment in 
fixed assets / total GDP) 
(Log) Ratio of Domestic private 
investment to GDP 
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Table 3 Capital investments in fixed assets to GDP ratio (1991-1999) 
  Coastal 
(Ratio) 
Inland 
(Ratio) 
Ratio 
(Coastal/inland) 
Total investment in fixed assets to GDP   0.370  0.298  1.243 
Public investment to GDP   0.261  0.231  1.128 
SOEs investment to GDP   0.202  0.207  0.976 
COEs investment to GDP   0.059  0.025  2.397 
Foreign investment to GDP   0.056  0.012  4.542 
Total investment by foreign-funded enterprises to 
GDP  
0.039  0.009  4.465 
Total investment by Overseas Chinese-funded 
enterprises to GDP   0.017  0.004  4.743 
Domestic private investment to GDP   0.071  0.062  1.160 
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Table 4. Estimation of Disaggregated capital investments ratios 
 
Note:  
***Significant at the 0.01 error level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 error level. * Significant at the 0.10 error level. 
Both one-step and two-step GMM estimation results are listed.  
t-value in ( ). P-values in [ ]. 
Sargan and AR(1) and AR(2) tests are based on the two-step results. 
I  Ln per capita real GDPit 
GMM-1  GMM-2 
Ln per capita real GDPit-1    0.8505 
(41.5)*** 
0.8552 
(40.7)*** 
Ln Population growth    -0.0333 
(-1.95)* 
-0.0286 
(-1.66)** 
  0.0212 
(1.26) 
0.0154 
(0.748) 
Ln public investment to GDP ratio 
0 ?   -0.0164 
(-0.771) 
-0.0199 
(-0.953) 
  0.0293 
(2.0)** 
0.0281 
(2.21)**  Ln Foreign investment in fixed asset to GDP 
ratio 
0 ?   -0.0160 
(-1.39) 
-0.0143 
(-1.06) 
  0.036 
(1.92)* 
0.0328 
(1.76)*  Ln Domestic Private investment to GDP 
ratio 
0 ?   0.0329 
(1.87)* 
0.0320 
(1.79)* 
Distance     -0.1287 
(-5.70)*** 
-0.1315 
(-4.48)*** 
Sq distance    0.0302 
(5.61)*** 
0.0304 
(4.10)*** 
Constant     1.4627 
(7.24)*** 
1.4276 
(6.56)*** 
RSS    0.4998  0.4812 
Sargan test    Chi^2 (35) = 17.36 [0.995] 
AR(1)    -2.040 [0.041]** 
AR(2)    0.4714 [0.637] 
No. of Observation    196  196 
? -calculated    0.162  0.156 
t-calculated    4.278  4.443  
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Figure  2 
Cross-section distribution of regional economic growth rates between 
1991 and 1999
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Figure 3 
Standard deviation of LN pc GDP
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Time series of capital investment ratio by Foreign and Private sector
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Figure 5 
Ln Real GDP Per Capita in 1999
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